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THE THEORY OF ALLOCATION AND ITS  IMPLICATIONS 
FOR MARKETING AND INDUSTRIAL STRUCTURE 
ABSTRACT 
This  paper identifies a cost of using the price system and 
from that develops a general theory of allocation.  The theory 
explains why a buyer's stochastic purchasing behavior matters to 
a seller.  This leads to a theory of optimal customer mix much 
akin to the theory of optimal portfolio composition.  It is the 
ob  of a firm's  marketing department to put together this optimal 
customer mix. 
A dynamic pattern of pricing related to Ramsey pricing 
emerges as the efficient pricing structure.  Price no longer 
equals marginal cost and is no longer the sole mechanism used to 
allocate goods.  It is optimal for long term relationships to 
emerge between buyers and sellers and for sellers to use their 
knowledge about buyers to ration goods during periods when demand 
is high.  This rationing cam take the form of refusing to sell to 
new customers and putting established customers on quotas.  The 
evidence shows that this form of rationing, though foreign to the 
thinking of most economists, characterizes several industries. 
The theory provides an important incentive for a firm to 
exist, namely to facilitate trade amongst its customers.  The 
theory also provides a convincing explanation f  or the hostility 
that new futures markets face from established firms in the 
industry and shows that several practices, like price differences 
amongst consumers and swapping product with rivals, can be the 
result of competition and not market power. 
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and NBER -2— 
I,  Introduction 
Microeconomics is concerned with the efficient  alloca- 
tion of goods.  It is typical for economists to focus on the 
price system as the mechanism used to achieve this  efficient 
allocation.  An impersonal  auction system is often in the 
back of most economistst minds when they think of efficient 
resource allocation.  Other mechanisms to allocate goods 
such as rationing  are usually considered inferior to  a price 
system and  are not given much attention1  The economists 
exclusive  focus on price comes from an implicit assumption 
that use of the price system is costless.  After all,  if it 
is costless to use the price system to achieve an efficient 
allocation,  why not use it? 
This paper explains that economistst faith in the price 
system is misplaced from the viewpoint of both theory and 
evidence.  Prices alone should not be viewed as the most 
efficient  way of allocating goods in many industries.  The 
paper identifies a cost of using the price system and from 
that develops a general theory of allocation that has sig- 
nificant implications  for optimal allocation and industrial 
organization,  The theory explains the role of market making 
and marketing -— and thereby provides an explanation for 
important  features of the modern corporation, such as 
1.  Coase (1937)  and Weitzman (1974)  are notable 
exceptions. marketing and planning departments,  that have received rela- 
tively little attention  from economists. 
The theory explains how even  the most physically  homo- 
geneous good can be quite heterogeneous from  the seller's 
vantage point depending on the buyer's stochastic  purchasing 
characteristics,  This leads to a theory of optimal customer 
mix  much akin to the theory of optimal portfolio  composi- 
tion.  It is the job of a firm's  marketing department  to put 
together this optimal customer mix.  A  dynamic pattern of 
pricing related to optimal  Ramsey pricing emerges as the 
efficient  pricing structure.  Price no longer equals margim— 
al cost and is no longer the sole mechanism used to allocate 
goods.  It is natural and optimal for long term relation- 
ships  to emerge between buyers and sellers and for sellers 
to use their knowledge about buyers to ration goods during 
periods when demand is high.  This rationing  can take the 
form of refusing to sell  to new customers  and putting estab- 
lished customers on quotas.  This form of rationing, though 
foreign to the thinking of most economists,  seems to charac- 
terize several industries,  as  I  report later on.  The theory 
provides an important  incentive for  a firm to exist,  namely 
to facilitate trade amongst its customers.  The theory iden- 
tifies the incentives that firms have to invest in marketing 
and plmnning.  Finally,  the theory provides a convincing 
explanation for the hostility that  new futures markets face 
from established firms in the industry and shows that -4- 
several  practices, like price differences to consumers  and 
swapping product with rivals, that are often associated  with 
market power can instead  be the result of competitive  market 
forces. 
This paper is organized as follows  Section II ex- 
plains why  it is wrong to regard the use of the price system 
as free and presents some puzzling facts that do not accord 
with the economic intuition from price clearing theories of 
market behavior.  Section III develops the theory  of optimal 
allocation in the presence of a cost of using the price 
system under some simple assumptions.  Sections IV, V and VI 
examine equilibrium and show how  to modify the theory so as 
to relax several of its simple assumptions.  Section  VI 
explains how a firm  can facilitate trade amongst its custom- 
ers.  Section VII reports on empirical evidence that sup- 
ports the  theory.  Section VIII discusses the implications 
of the theory for the role of marketing, choice  of customer 
mix,  capital investment,  attitudes toward the development of 
futures markets and swapping with rivals.  Section IX 
presents conclusions. 
II.  Organizing A Market That Clears By Price 
is Costly, and For That Reason Many 
Markets Do Not Clear By Price -5— 
Every economics  student learns that price adjusts  so as 
to equate  supply and demand.  A  (fictional) auctioneer often 
is used to explain how price is set.  This auctioneer 
doesn't even earn the minimum wage.  All firms are assumed 
to have access to the price mechanism that allows  them to 
costlessly market their goods.  There is no need for long 
term relationships between buyers and sellers and non-price 
rationing never occurs. 
Most economists recognize that there an relatively few 
markets like the one I  just described, yet this description 
is the model that guides  most economists'  intuition.  I will 
soon describe why that intuition can sometimes be misleid- 
ing.  Before I do that, it is worth emphasizing the costs of 
setting up an auction market based on the few actual exam- 
ples we have of such markets.  Once the  costs of setting up 
an auction market are recognized, it follows irediately 
that other allocation mechanisms may be superior. 
One can learn a great deal about the cost of a price 
system by  studying institutions  whose business is to create 
such markets (see  Carlton (1984))2.  For example, if one 
studies the  Chicago Board of Trade one  observes  the  follow- 
ing  I 
1.  a  large building in  an expensive  part of  town, 
2.  Carlton, D.W., 'Futures Markets:  Their Purpose, Their 
History, Their Growth, Their Successes & Failures,' 
Journal of Futures  Markets, (Fall 1984)  4(3):237-27l. -6— 
2.  many people involved in each transaction (e.g. 
brokers, floor traders, employees  of a clearing- 
house,  consultants), 
3.  office buildings housing the people involved in 
each transaction, and 
4.  elaborate  record keeping. 
Undoubtedly the greatest cost is the time cost of all the 
people involved.  A significant fraction of the economy of 
the City of Chicago is devoted to the making of markets.  If 
a magic spell could be cast to make transactions costless, 
the Chicago economy would be devastated, at least  in the 
short run.  This emphasizes how  far from costless the making 
of markets really is. 
Aside from the fact that there are costs to setting up 
such  markets, it is also true that many markets once created 
fail.  Roughly one half of all successful futures narkets 
fail within 10 years of their introduction  (See Canton 
(l984)).  Since markets clearly produce at least  some bene- 
fits to its creators, the high failure rate must indicate 
the presence of significant costs of operation  which out- 
weigh these benefits.  Furthermore, only a small fraction of 
products have ever had futures markets.  Again,  this empha- 
sizes that there must be significant costs to the creation 
of such markets,  otherwise the benefits flowing from such 
markets would suggest a proliferation of such markets. 
3.  See note  2, supra at 5. 1n auction  market generates positive externalities.  It 
provides valuable information  to non-participants  without 
charge.  But once it is recognized that  it takes  real  re- 
sources to create a market, the existence of the positive 
externality guarantees that there is no reason  to expect the 
efficient number of markets to be created.4  Those who actu- 
ally transact in such  a market may  be charged a brokerage 
fee,  or be faced with a bid-ask spread, or with asymmetric 
information that allows brokers to trade profitably.  But 
the point remains  that the marginal charge for participation 
may  not  reflect social benefits and therefore  may fail  to 
create incentives  for the broker or market maker to continue 
the market even when the social benefits are great.  Once it 
is recognized that a  market produces  a product-namely  the 
allocation  of the good — the  conclusion that  there is not an 
efficient incentive  to create markets follows by analogy to 
the work on optimal product variety.  See Spence (l976) and 
Dixit and Stiglitz (1977)6.  If markets do not get created, 
alternative mechanisms to allocate goods must be used. 
4.  The existence  of one market can affect the benefits of 
another.  In such a setting,  it is conceivable  that 
either too many or too few markets get  created. 
5.  Spence, N,,  Product  Differentiation  & Welfare," 
American Economic  Review,  (May  1976)  407-414. 
6.  Dixit,  A., & Stiglitz, 3.,  "Monopolistic  Competition 
and Optimum Product Diversity," Bell_Journ, (1977), 
29  7-308. -8- 
Aside from the relative paucity of auction type mar- 
kets,  there is considerable additional evidence that does 
not square with the predictions that emerge from the usual 
market clearing model.  I  have elaborated on some of this 
evidence at length elsewhere (Canton (1986,  1989)), and  so 
only summarize  the evidence here. 
For what appear to be homogeneous goods,8 there is 
often a very low correlation in price movements across buy- 
ers.  Moreover,  buyers and sellers are often  married" to 
each other for  long periods of time (e.g.  several years). 
It is frequently  true in some industries that price,  once 
set  to a buyer,  does not change for periods in excess of one 
or two years or more.  The degree of market concentration is 
related to the rigidity of price.  There are frequent claims 
in some  industries  that non-price rationing is occurring 
when  demand is high with regular customers receiving  pre- 
ferred treatment.9  Finally, the rise of the modern corpora- 
tion in the  late  1880's resulted in the need to have sales- 
man and marketing departments whose responsibility  was to 
7.  Carlton,  D.W.,  "The Rigidity of Price," American 
Economic Review, (September 1986)  and "The Theory and 
Facts of How Markets Clear:  Is Industrial  Organization 
Useful for Understanding Macroeconomics," Chapter 15 in 
R.  Schmalensee and R. Willig ed.,  Handbook of 
Industrial  Organization, (1989).  A revised  version 
appears in Chapter 21 of D. Carlton and J.  Perloff, 
Modern Industrial Organization, Scott-Foresmen (1990). 
8.  The  goods  are typically intermediate manufactured goods 
(e.g.,  steel,  copper, paper and chemicals). 
9.  Section V presents some of this evidence in detail. learn about their rustomers and  sell  goods,  (Chandler 
(l977))l.  This  contrsl feature of the modern corporation 
is not easily explicable in  a world in which goods  can be 
costlessly sold  on an auction market. 
III.  The Cost of Using the Price System 
in the absence of an suction  market, a firm that sets  a 
price runs the risk that it has set the wrong price.  If the 
price is to low,  too much is demanded and the firm has  to 
ration customers.  If the price is set too high,  then too 
few customers  purchase and the firm is stuck with excess 
capacity.  By the time the firm figures out whether it has 
set  the wrong price,  it is too late -- the customers  have 
already gone (if the price is too high) or have placed their 
order at the low price(  if the price is too low).  This then 
creates a real cost  of using the price system to allocate 
goods.  More precisely,  because of uncertainty  as to the 
level of demand,  the firm is unable to set  the market clear- 
ing price.  The information  set over which the firm can  set 
price ex ante is "coarser"  than the ex post realizations  of 
demand.  (Later on, we see how this information  set is 
endogenously  determined). 
10.  Chandler,  A., The Visible Hand,  Harvard University 
Press,  Cambridge,  Mass (1977). -  10  - 
Let us illustrate  this cost of using the price system 
in the context  of a simple model.  See Figure 1.  Suppose 
that there is a firm whose production technology involves a 
fixed cost F and a constant marginal cost up to a fixed 
capacity K.  Suppose that the customers of the firm in ag- 
gregate have a demand curve of either DL (the  low state of 
demand) or DH (the high state of demand) but the firm does 
not know which of the two demand curves is applicable.  If 
the firm knew that DH prevailed, it would charge a market 
clearing price of XH while if it knew that DL prevailed, it 
would charge  a market clearing price of 1L1'  The firm can, 
by assumption,  choose only one price.  No matter which price 
the firm chooses,  there will be an allocative inefficiency. 
If it charges a price above XL 
it creates a deadweight loss 
when DL prevails.  If it charges a price below XH 
it is 
likely to create a deadweight loss when DH prevails since it 
faces excess demand.  For example, as Figure 1 illustrates, 
if the firm charges XH 
the firm would create  a zero dead- 
weight loss when DH prevailed, but  would create a deadweight 
loss  of ABCD when DL prevailed. 
11.  I will  soon focus only on firms that compete with each 
other to attract customers.  The statement in the text 
also holds true for a monopolist, provided the relevant 
marginal revenue curves intersect the marginal cost 
curve in its vertical portion. ii  — 
Figure  1 - Cost  of Charging 
Figure 1  illustrates  the cost of using price to allo 
cate.  There may be an alternative method of allocatfon that 
avoids or lowers  this  cost.  We usually never have occasion 
to consider such an alternative because of the assumption of 
costless use of a price system. 
To illustrate  the point,  let me use an extreme example. 
Suppose that  the seller has perfect knowledge  about the 
relative demands of his buyers.  For example, suppose that 
the  seller knows  that he has only two buyers, each of whom 
are identical  in their demands,  Then,  the firm knows 
the efficient allocation even though it has no idea 
whether the market clearing price is  or  The firm 
should give K of its output to each buyer.  By using its 
2 
knowledge about its customers, the firm is able  to achieve 
the efficient  allocation of resources  even though it has no 
idea of the correct market clearing price.  It is precisely 
this simple point -- that knowledge about buyers assists 
efficient allocation -— that  is ignored in most analyses but —  12  - 
provides  the key  to understanding the role of marketing 
departments,  and the behavior of many firms  and  industries. 
The simplification  used in the preceding example of 
perfect rationing  ability is obviously unrealistic.  If it 
is costly to use the price system to allocate,  it is likely 
to be costly to use other non-price methods and vice versa. 
But the simplification  is a useful point to begin the analy- 
sis and is relaxed later.  Notice that these simplifying 
assumptions  -- costly use of a price system but costless use 
of non-price  methods -- is  the precise opposite of the as- 
sumptions  usually made. 
In the usual model, the price mechanism  produces the 
optimal allocation  and simultaneously generates  enough 
revenue  to finance the firm.'2  Once there is  a cost to 
using the price system, there is no longer a unique corre- 
spondence  between the achievement of the optimal allocation 
and the financing of the firm.  For example,  the firm could 
theoretically charge a zero price and achieve  the efficient 
allocation in the simple model just presented.  However such 
a firm  would not have any incentive to remain in business. 
One solution to the firmts problem of raising suffi- 
cient revenue in the context of the preceding example is to 
have the firm charge XL  Notice, from Figure  1, that if the 
12.  See Sheshinski and Dreze (1976)  for  an analysis of 
competition  in the presence of fluctuating  demand. firm charges 1, then it does earn revenue  in excess of  L 
variable  cost  and its use of the price system causes no 
potential for deadweight loss.  As  long as price is less 
than or equal to A, no deadweight loss  is created.  But 
what if the revenue  generated is not enough to cover the 
fixed costs F of the firm and what financial  incentives are 
there for the firm to allocate efficiently? 
In order  to begin to address these questions, let us 
make the model of the firm a bit more realistic.  The pro- 
duction technology  of the firm will still be constant re- 
turns to scale up to some capacity K and require  the expen- 
diture of  a fixed cost F.  As before, there will be situa- 
tions in which the firm must set a single price without 
knowing whether  the demand curve is DL 
or 
DR.  If demand is 
either DL or DH,  we say that demand is in state 1, so that 
state 1 contains  two possible outcomes (low and high)  for 
demand.  As before,  we continue to make the simplifying 
assumption that  the firm knows that its customers are iden- 
tical so that the firm can,  if  it chooses to, achieve the 
efficient  allocation.  We also introduce  another state of 
demand, state 0, knowable in advance to the firm so that the 
market clearing price can be set  if the  firm  chooses to do 
so.  The demand curve in state 0 is Do and is composed of 
the same buyers as in state 1.  The configuration of the 
demand curves in state 0 and state 1 is illustrated  in Fig- 
ure 2.  We assume  that state 0 and state 1 occur with equal -  14  - 
probabilities and that within state 1 that DH and D  occur 
with equal  probabilities. 
Figure 2  Demand Curves 
0N  N  DL 
1< 
We want  to investigate how  the firm should price in 
order to cover its fixed cost.  We first analyze how a 
social planner  would solve this problem.  As usual,  competi- 
tion will force precisely this discipline on firms.  The 
problem we seek to solve can be stated as follows  choose a 
method of pricing goods in state 0 and state 1 such that 
fixed costs  are covered and deadweight loss  is minimized. 
This is a variant of a standard problem in public finance. 
The new twist is that the price in state 1 is independent  of 
whether the demand realization is DH or 
DL. 
The optimal solution to this problem is to use  lump sum 
taxes and marginal cost pricing or some other non-linear 
pricing scheme.  As in the usual public finance context, 
this  perfect theoretical solution is usually impractical and is not  common.  For example, when buyers pay lump sum fees, 
there are incentives  for buyers to merge and aggregate  pur- 
chases to avoid the lump sum fee.  Here,  I want to examine a 
relatively simple and common form  of pricing, the charging 
of unit prices that differ over  demand states.  The motiva- 
tion for studying this form of pricing is that in my earlier 
work  (Carlton  (1986fl13,  I  found it common that a buyer 
would face  a price and then would choose quantity.  I 
discuss non-linear  pricing later on.  Let  us now solve  the 
social planners problem -- which  should remind the reader 
of the usual Ramsey pricing problem. 
The problem is to choose taxes,  to and t1, 
to add to 
marginal cost c in each state so as to cover cost F and 
create the minimum expected deadweight loss.  Mathematically 
we have 
—  Q0  (c+t)  QL (c+l 
t,tj  [P0  (q)-cI dq - 1/4 
j<  p  (q)  - 
S.t.  (c+t0) 
+ 1/4 t1 Q  (c+t1) 
+ 1/4  t1 
K = F, 
where 
Q (  )  =  demand curve in state 0.  This 
occurs  with probability 1/2, 
P (  )  =  inverse demand  curve in state 0  0 
c  constant unit cost, 
L  = demand  curve  in state 1 - low 
demand. This demand  occurs with 
probability 1/2 in state  1  (which 
itself occurs with probability 
13.  See note 7, sp  at  g. -  16  - 
1/2), 
= inverse  demand curve in state  I  — 
low  demand. 
demand curve in state 1  - high 
demand.  This occurs with 
probability 1/2  in state  1  (which 
itself occurs with probability 
1/2), 
K  = capacity, 
t  t  = taxes,  and  0  1 
F  = fixed  costs. 
The first term in the objective function is the dead- 
weight loss that results in state 0 from a tax  to.  The 
second term is the deadweight loss that results in state 1 - 
low demand from a tax 
t1.  There is no term corresponding to 
the deadweight loss arising in state 1 - high  demand state. 
That is because as long as the price is below ), the  as- 
sumption of perfect rationing guarantees that the firm allo- 
cates its K units efficiently)4 The constraint expresses 
the requirement that the overall expected revenues cover the 
fixed costs. 
14.  Under some  circumstances, t,  may be so high that the 
price in state 1 will exceed 
XH (see  Figure 2), and 
there would be a third term in the objective function. 
We will in general obtain deadweight loss in the high 
state of demand in state 1 when we relax the perfect 
rationing  assumption later on, and so here maintain the 
simpler assumption that the price in state 1 does not 
exceed X —  17  — 
It is straightforward to solve  for the  optimal tax 
rates.  (See Appendix Theorem 1.)  The optimal tax rates, 
t, (o/), 
and 
t1, (t1/p)  satisfy 
(1)  a l/E  and 
a  (l+f) l/i  where 
15  = elasticity of demand in demand state i,  and 
£ K 
Q1  (c+t.) 
Notice that f is the ratio of K to  and therefore 
always exceeds 1.  As t1 increases,  falls and hence f 
rises.  Therefore, f becomes larger  as the required revenue, 
F, and required taxes increase.  ?loreover, f increases  the 
more "spread  apart" are the demand curves in state 1,  since 
L  £  increases  as  falls. 
If  = t, then  (1)  simplifies  to 
(2)  t1 
=  (l+f) 
15.  I have  assumed that the elasticity of demand is the 
same  for  the curves  and Q. 
It is straightforward 
to relax this  assumption. -  18  - 
Eq  (2)  shows that in general it is optimal to cause a pric- 
ing distortion in both state 0 and state 1 with the price in 
state I exceeding  that in state 0. 
It is straightforward  to show that if there are several 
states of demand,  i, each of which contain pairs of demand 
H  .  curves,  Q.  and Q.  ,  1 ￿  1,  among which the firm cannot 
distinguish,  the optimal taxes, t, satisfy 
(3)  . =  (l+f.)  ,  where  f. =  K  1  1  0  1 
If  the states  of demand are such that  increases  with i, 
then taxes will tend  to increase with i since  will 
increase with i.'6 
The preceding  derivations produced very simple pricing 
rules.  The reader may think that these rules  come from the 
simple assumptions  I have made about only two unobservable 
demand curves in state 1 and about the particular configura- 
tion of these curves as shown in Figure 2.  It turns out 
that the simple pricing rules just derived hold under much 
more general assumptions  -— as  I now demonstrate. 
Let each  demand state i consist of a family of demand 
curves indexed  by n,  (Q.  (P.  n)).  Let demand be increasing 
in n which has  a probability density function g.(n).  Demand 
is increasing  in  i in the sense that the probability density 
16.  It appears  possible that the optimal taxes  could 
decrease with i depending on the behavior of marginal 
revenue from taxation relative to the marginal 
deadweight loss.  (See  Appendix Theorem 2).  This would 
lead to the possibility of countercyclical prices. 19 - 
g.(n)  has more weight in the upper tail as i increases.  Let 
n*  be that n such that Q(c+t. ni*) 
= K.  The  interpreta- 
tion  of  n,*  is  that  it  identifies  all  the  demand  curves 
1 
(n<n.*)  for which a deadweight loss occurs if price is ele 
vated above c+t.  .  For  all demand curves for which n > n.*  1  1 
there is no deadweight loss at c4t. since there is excess 
demand at that price and, by assumption, the firm can ration 
its fixed capacity efficiently.  This choice of n*  is il- 
lustrated in Figure 3. 
Figure 3  Family of Demand Curves in State i 
Q(c+t., ni*) 
<  chty 
We are now ready to solve the more general problem. 
The social planner wishes to choose taxes, t, to minimize 
deadweight loss subject to a zero profit constraint.  ?'athe- 
matically the firm's problem is 
(4)  Q(c + t  ,  n)  n."  Q1(c 
+ t.  ,  n) 
mm s J g0 (n)  /  (Pc?  dq dn+ Es.  /  1 
g.(n) I  IP.-ctdq  dn 
(t.)  ——  Q0(c,n) 
1  1  K  1 -  20  - 
subject  to 
n,* 
S  ft  Q0 g(n)  dn + Zs  [/  'g1(n)  t1 Q(c+t,  n) dn 
+  J  g(n)  do t. KI = F,  and  1 
1 
Q.  (c+t.  n)  = K,  for  all  i  1  1  1 
where 
g(n) 
= probability density of n in state i, 
P  (q,n) = inverse demand curve in state i, case n, 
(P,n) = demand  curve  in  state  i, case n, 
= probability of state i,  and 
all other terms were previously defined. 
The first  term in the objective function reflects the 
deadweight lost from charging c+t0 rather than c in state 
The second term represents the deadweight loss  from 
charging c+t instead  of c in state i.  Notice that dead- 
weight loss  occurs only in state i for n < n1'.  The revenue 
constraints  has three components.  First is the revenue 
earned in state 0;  second is revenue earned in state i when 
the amount demanded is less  than K; third is revenue earned 
in state  i when the amount supplied in exactly K. 
Solving (4) for the optimal tax rates,  assuming the 
price elasticities  of demand are equal across states,  yields 
17.  For simplicity,  I  have assumed that in state 0 demand 
is always  below K  at price c. -  21 
(5)  t.  1l+f.)  where  1  0'  1 
£  =  *  g.(n)  do 
I __________ 
ni* 
f  g.(n)  Q(c+t.,n)  do 
From the assumptions  made,  it follows immediately  that f.  > 
0.  As noted earlier,  it is expected that prices will vary 
procyclically, but it appears possible that price could 
actually move countercyclically  depending on the rate at 
which deadweight loss  and marginal revenue from taxation 
increase relative to each other as i and t. increases.  (See 
Appendix, Theorem 2). 
The  model I  have just worked out is a relatively simple 
one but it contains three interesting  implications. 
1,  The amplitude  of price fluctuations tends  to be 
smaller  than that  which would occur in the usual 
market clearing model,  with price being higher in 
low demand states and lower in high demand states. 
2.  Even under the perfect rationing assumption,  there 
is a deadweight loss  that arises from using price 
to raise  revenue to finance the firm.  This 
deadweight loss  rises  the greater the 'spread' of 
the family of unobservable demand curves in each 
observable state,  Analocous to theories in public 
finance, it follows  that the firm may use non 
linear pricing schemes to finance its  output. —  22  — 
Since  these schemes are difficult to enforce, a 
reason for vertical integration arises,  provided 
the vertically integrated firm is better able to 
enforce a non-linear pricing scheme among its 
divisions than it could if it were charging non- 
linear prices to independent agents. 
3.  The firm and customer benefit if there are more 
products for the firm to  'tax.'  This follows 
immediately from the theory of public finance 
which teaches that the deadweight loss  from rais- 
ing a given amount of revenue declines as more 
products are  taxed.  Therefore, there is an econo- 
my of scope in the financing of the firm.  This 
economy of scope  is unrelated to both production 
and marketing considerations.  A firm could 
achieve this economy of scope if it sold multiple 
products simultaneously or if it sold the same 
physical product at different points in the busi- 
ness cycle to the same customer.  This economy of 
scope  provides one reason for buyers and sellers 
to be  'married'  to each other for long periods of 
time.  The seller commits to supply the buyer and 
the buyer commits to purchase from the seller over 
an extended time period.  The implication is that 
a steady customer may well be treated  differently 
than a sporadic one. —  23  - 
So  far,  we  have examined the socially optimal  behavior 
of a mingle firm.  We now address the following  questions: 
a) how  is equilibrium determined?; 
h) what happens if rationing  is not perfect?; 
c) how will the firm choose its customers  when 
cuatoners are not  homogeneoua?; 
d) how can a firm invest to improve its rationing 
ability?; and 
a) what determines the optimal K for  a firm?, 
Iv,  Equilibrium 
A.  Competition 
i  now describe the competitive equilibrium for the 
simple  model.  Equilibrium requires buyers and sellers to 
contract with each other in advance for price and quantity. 
The price and quantity allocations  depend on the observed 
state of demand.  Competition forces firms  to offer a price 
and ability to allocate that maximizes consumer surplus and 
18  forces sirms to earn zero expected profits. 
18.  The equilibrium is a long run concept in which entry 
erodes profits and all buyers and sellers  are married. 
A more general model could have an equilibrium  in which 
a steady strean of transient  buyers appear,  buy in a 
spot market, end  leave.  These transient buyers would 
bear the cost of using the price system and would pay 
on average a higher price than the married buyers. 
Without the ability of married  buyers and sellers to 
(Footnote  Continued) -  24  - 
In  order to focus  attention on the key aspects of equi- 
librium,  consider the demand curves, d, dL, and dH, of a 
customer of an individual  firm and the supply available to 
serve that  customer.  For simplicity, we initially  take all 
consumers to be identical.  If a firm's capacity is K, then 
it is as  if each of N customers of the firm have a mini-firm 
with capacity of K/N.  As the number of customers served by 
a firm decreases, the capacity available to serve  each 
customer increases.  For example, the capacity devoted to 
serving each  customer rises from K/N  to K/N-i as the number 
of customers  decreases from N to N-l.  See Figure  4. 
Figure 4 - Per  Capita Demand and Supply 
(9. 
(Footnote  Continued) 
monitor each other,  problems with a core not existing 
could arise.  See Telser (1978). 
dH A decrease in the number of customers at a firm has two 
opposing effects.  First, it means that there are fewer 
occasions when  rationing is recuired and during those tines 
when customers are on allocation, more of each customers 
demands can be satisfied.  This raises consumer surplus. 
Second,  because the same amount of revenue must be raised to 
cover the fixed costs regardless of the number of customers, 
the tax burden on the remaining customers increases  and 
reduces  their consumer surplus.  For some N*,  the firm, 
constrained  to earn  zero profits, maximizes consumer surplus 
per customer.  See Figure 5.  Any firm with either fewer or 
more customers than N* would be unable to successfully com- 
pete for customers.  What is interesting about the equilib- 
rium is that the size of a firm matters to its customers 
because it affects  the firms  ability to finance itself and 
efficiently  allocate resources.  Shortly, we develop a theo- 
ry of customer  mix,  once the assumption of identical  consum- 
ers is relaxed.  Once N*  is determined, eq.  (3)  determines 
the optimal pricing in equilibrium. 
One interesting  comparative static exercise is to com 
pare the equilibrium  to the one that results when use of the 
price system is not  costly.  i  mow explain why the optimal 
customer size  tends  to be smaller when use of the price -  26  — 
system  is costless.19  (See Appendix Theorem 3 for more 
detailed discussion)  .  Consider the consumer surplus curve 
in Figure 5 
Figure 5 - Per  Capita Consumer Surplus 
Number 
The curve initially  rises because as the number of 
customers  increases  the gain in utility from a reduced per 
capita tTtax  burden exceeds the increase in deadweight loss 
from having less  output per  customer to allocate.  Notice 
that the allocative efficiency  properties of a system with 
perfect rationing  could be identical  to the (costless)  price 
system but for the financing constraint.  But the financing 
constraint imposes  a deadweight loss in each state of nature 
because the tax causes a marginal distortion.  This marginal 
19.  Although the analysis assumes a fixed K, it is possible 
to reinterpret  the results as applying to a situation 
where each unit of capacity costs F and K is freely 
chosen,  All theorems would then apply to K/N. 27 
distortion is not present when the price system is costless 
and  a different  price can  he charged for every realized 
demsnd state,  Deadweight loss falls as the number of states 
in which to charge taxes increases and the marginal distor- 
tions fall on average.  Therefore, as more customers are 
added,  the gain from being able to lower "taxes" saves more 
deadweight loss when firms are using rationing (since exist- 
ing average  distortions are larger).  This creates an incen- 
tive for these firms to be larger than they would be if 
using the price system were costless.  This is especially 
true the wider the divergence between the unobservable  de- 
mand curves within any one observable state of demand be- 
cause that is a situation  with large marginal distortions. 
Therefore,  the number of customers served by a firm tends to 
decrease as the cost of using the price system falls,  and 
there will be more  firms.  In this sense, a costless price 
system and atomistic  competition go hand in hand. 
B.  Monopoly 
The monopoly solution is similar to the one just de- 
rived.  A monopolist  maximizes his profit by adopting a 
pricing scheme and quantity allocation that efficiently 
allocates the goods  he does sell.  This implies that  the 
monopolist!s  prices, though generally higher than a -  28  - 
competitors,  will also satisfy equations like  (3)•20  A 
monopolist charges higher prices than competitors,  and,  as a 
result,  he diminishes his need to rely  upon rationing.  The 
fact that the monopolist can charge higher prices than would 
prevail under competition means that  f in (3)  is higher 
under monopoly and,  therefore, that there would tend to be 
more procyclical price movement for  a monopolist. 
V.  Relaxing the Assumption of Perfect Rationing 
The assumption that firms have the ability to perfectly 
rank their customers' relative need for a good is obviously 
unrealistic.  In reality,  a firm will  have difficulty allo- 
cating its output capacity,  K, among its customers and will 
not,  in general, be able to duplicate the efficient alloca- 
tion that would result if use of the price system were cost- 
less. 
When non-price methods entail costs, then the problem 
facing the firm becomes more complex.  Let R stand for the 
firm's rationing  ability.  It represents that  fraction of 
maximum consumer plus producer surplus that a firm can 
achieve for any given demand curve.  For example,  in Figure 
20.  The monopolist maximize profits subject to a utility 
constraint.  If maximum profits are  11k,  then the 
optimal solution will maximize utility subject  to the 
constraint that  profits equal  fl*•  This maximization 
problem is similar to the one solved by (3). 6,  P.  is the fraction of ABCD 
far,  I have taken  P.  to equal 1. 
Figure  6 - Consumer  Plus  Producer Surplus 
There will be many factors that influence P..  For exam- 
ple, R will depend upon the number and heterogeneity of 
customers,  the knowledge that  a firm has about its customers 
and the price a firm charges.  The more numerous and hetero- 
geneous are customers, the more complicated it is for a firm 
to know which customers have the greatest need for its prod- 
uct.  The more knowledge a firm has about its customers, the 
easier it is for  the firm to allocate efficiently.  One 
function of salesmen is to understand the needs of their 
customers,  and in times of shortage,  make sure that those 
customers  who need the good the most obtain it. 
When it ia costly to allocate by non-price methods, the 
efficiency  of the non-price method of allocation will depend 
—  2g  — 
that  the firm can generate.  So 
A -  30  — 
on  the price charged.  By reducing the amount  of excess 
demand in periods of shortages, a high price reduces the 
number of customer (or units demanded) over  which non—price 
allocation methods are  used.  It is as if price is used as 
the first screen to identify the  most likely candidates to 
receive the good,  and then non-price methods are used for 
the final allocation.  As price rises,  the deadweight loss 
from inefficiently reducing consumption in low demand states 
(i.e.  the cost of using the price system identified  in Fig- 
ure 1) increases,  but the cost of inefficiently  allocating 
by non-price methods the excess demand in high demand states 
falls.  The general point is that it is efficient  to use 
both price and non-price  allocations when each  are costly to 
use, 
To see this point,  consider the following  example il- 
lustrated in Figure 7.  Suppose that one state of demand has 
two unobservable states.  If a price  is charged  and DH 
occurs  ,  Q  units are demanded and the firm  must decide 
which K of those to satisfy.  If instead a higher price P" 
is charged and DH occurs,  only Q** is demanded.  The  firm 
has a better chance of generating the maximum consumer plus 
producer surplus in the latter case since the lower value 
users have been screened out by the higher  price.  Notice 
**  that although the higher price P  improves the efficiency 
of the non-price rationing if  occurs,  the higher price 
creates a larger  deadweight loss if DL occurs because the —  31  — 
higher price drives consumption farther  below K.  This iden- 
tifies the trade-off  between the use of price and non-price 
methods of allocation.  In general, it will be optimal to 
use both price and non-price methods to achieve efficient 
allocation  when the use of each creates some deadweight 
loss 
(-C 
Figure 7  -  Interaction  Between Prices and Non-Price 
Rationing When Both Are Costly 
As a firm's rationing ability improves,  it tends to 
rely less on price to achieve efficiency and its pricing 
tends to become less procyclical.  To see this point intui- 
tively, notice that if a high price is not needed for eff  i- 
ciency reasons to help allocate goods in times of shortage, 
then it pays to reduce 
t1 and shift taxes to the other (low- 
er) observable states of demand.  More rigorously, the firm 
faces the following  problem: 
QuQ i+j —  32  — 
Q  (c+t)  Q  (c+t1) 
mm  -1  / 
[P0  (q)-cJ dg -  1/4  /  [P  (g)  - cldq  t,t  2  (c)  K  0  1  Qo 
(6)  -1/4 (1-P.)  1K  [P(q) 
- c[  dq, 
S.t.  1 tQ  (c+t) + 1/4  t1 Q  (c+t1) 
+ 1/4  t1 K = F, 
where all terms have been previously defined. 
The only difference between this problem and the one solved 
earlier is the presence of  (1—P.) multiplying the last  term 
in the objective function.  When R=l,  (6)  is identical  to 
the earlier problem. 
Solving (6)  yields the optimal solutions  for (t0, t1). 
It is possible to prove that under certain assumptions 
at  > 0  and  at  < 0.  (See Appendix Theorem 4.)  This means 
that the firm relies less  on price to clear markets in peak 
demand periods as the firm's rationing ability improves.  It 
also implies that prices becomes less procyclical  as ration- 
ing ability improves. 
Since customers are no longer assumed to be identical 
and since the firm has some  knowledge about each customer, 
it follows that the optimal price and allocation  policy 
varies from customer to customer.  In an effort to obtain an 
efficient allocation, the firm prices to screen out  low 
value demanders before it relies on non-price allocation 
methods.  If  a firm has different knowledge about each consumer then the firm should charge each consumer a differ- 
ent  price. 
To understand  this point,  suppose that the  firm  is in a 
neriod of shortage and that it has two customers.  See Fig- 
ure  8. 
Figure  8 - Charging Consumers  Different Prices 
pri  N  -\\- 
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Customer A has a demand curve that is either 
D1 
or D3, 
while Customer B has a demand curve that is 
D2.  The optimal 
allocation in the case where the demand curve of Customer A 
is 
D1, 
is  to Customer A and q  to Customer B, where  + 
K.  In the case where the demand curve of Customer A is 
the optimal allocation is  to Customer A and  to 
Customer B, where q* 
+ q* 
= K.  If the same  price were 
charged to each customer and that price were below P1. then 
the rationing  efficiency of the firm is seriously impaired 
when Customer As  demand is high and equals D3.  The reason 
is that  so many units are demanded by Customer A that it 
makes it difficult to allocate the goods amongst customers 
when rationing  is imperfect.  In fact,  it is essential to -  34  - 
optimal operations that  different customers  pay different 
prices when both rationing and the price system are costly 
to use.  Different customers impose different costs  on the 
firms allocation ability and,  as should be expected,  dif- 
ferent costs should give rise to different prices.  The 
stochastic  buying characteristics of a customer affect the 
cost of servicing that customer.  A steady customer imposes 
less  costs on a firm than one who has variable demands and 
therefore should receive a lower price,  It is a consequence 
of the relaxation of costless operation of the price system 
that requires different customers  pay different prices in 
order to assure efficient operation.  Price differences 
among customers are a natural consequence  of market opera- 
tion when organized auction markets don1t exist. 
VI  The Role of the Firm n  Facilitating 
Trade Between Different  Customers 
This section explores in more detail the effect of 
differences among consumers.  The main point is to show how 
a firm acts to facilitate trade amongst customers  when there 
is a costly price system and when the firm can identify 
different groups of consumers.  This function of the firm 
has received little attention in the current treatments of 
the theory of the firm.  It is a role that could reasonably 
be identified with the marketing  departments of large firms. 
I  first allow customers to differ in the elasticity  of demand  in  state 0.  I then introduce  uncertainty in state I 
arid analyze the implications  of having a customer whose 
demands are only partially correlated  with the rest of the 
population. 
A)  Different  Elasticities 
Suppose that  there are two groups of customers,  Group A 
and Group B, who differ in only one respect; they have dif- 
ferent elasticities  of demand in state 0.  Their demands in 
state I are perfectly  correlated.  To fix ideas,  suppose 
that one group,  Group A, has a perfectly inelastic  demand in 
state 0.  Suppose  that a firm just has consumers from Group 
A as  its customers.  From the previous analysis, it follows 
that the optimal  solution is for the firtn  to charge a price 
X in state 1 such that Q(X)K  and charge a large enough fee 
in state  0 to cover the fixed costs.  Moreover, these con- 
sumers will have the maine consumption in the low state as in 
the high state of state 1.  (Indeed,  this solution is analo- 
gous to one involving  a two-part tariff.) 
Now consider a firm that caters solely to Group B. 
These customers  have a finite demand elasticity in state 0, 
so that,  as in the previously  worked out  inodels, they wind 
up paying a price in state 0 in excess of constant marginal 
cost,  c, and their consumption in the low state  in state 1 
is below that in the high state in state 1.  Compared to 
firms catering to Group A, firms catering to Group B will -  36 
have  less  capacity  per  customer (K/N  smaller)  because they 
are less efficient  at raising money to pay  for capacity. 
The question we now  address is whether a firm should 
serve both customer groups on the assumption  that the firm 
can separately identify each group.  That is,  is there an 
economy of scope in serving both groups?  The answer is 
generally yes.  To see why,  consider state I.  We know that 
in the case of a firm serving only Group B there is excess 
capacity in the  low state of state 1.  This excess capacity 
arises because one consequence of a costly price system is 
that the price in the low state of state  1 chokes off  too 
much demand. 
Now  consider a firm catering solely to Group A custom- 
ers.  These Group A customers could well  want  to consume 
more at a marginal cost of c than the amount that  they are 
currently consuming in that state.  Moreover,  the shadow 
price of the Group B consumers in the high state of state 1 
is higher than that of a Group A consumer (because  K/N is 
higher for the firm specializing in Group A consumers). 
Hence, there are gains for trade if a mechanism  could be 
devised.  The obvious problem is that if the price system is 
costly, it is hard for the two groups of customers  to trade 
in the two states  of state 1 that by assumption  cant have 
different prices because of the cost of creating  markets. 
It is precisely in this situation that the  firm  can step in 
and facilitate trade between the two groups. Recall that although a firm cannot charge different 
prices to a customer in the  two unobservable states  of state 
I, the firm can use  its knowledge  of customers' needs when 
rationing is heeded.  The optimal arrangement is for the 
firm to serve  the  two groups,  to use some  of the available 
capacity of  a Group B customer in the low state of state 1 
to serve a Group A customer,  and to switch the consumption 
of a Group A customer  to a Group B customer in the high 
state  of state 1.  But how can the firm find It in its fi- 
nancial interest  to do this?  After all,  it can't vary price 
between the two states in state 1,  The answer is that the 
firm can now raise (or lower)  the (lump sum)  tariff in state 
o to Group A customers.  These Group A customers can be 
thought of as "buying  consumption in the low  state  of state 
1  and paying for it by "selling"  consumption in the high 
state of state  1 and by paying (or receiving) money in state 
C.  The point is that  the firm serves the function of allow- 
ing consumers  to transact across states when the price sys- 
tem is too costly  to be used.  (The  exact terms of how Group 
A and Group B fare will depend on their relative population 
sizes.>  Therefore, in general,  we expect to see firms serv— 
ing multiple consumer  groups with each group paying dIffer- 
ent prices and being rationed differently.  As before, the 
firm's rationing  ability, R, will determine how efficient 
the reallocation  can be.  However, even if Rl, the firm 
will not,  in equilibrium,  reproduce the allocation of a -  38  - 
costless price system and it will still  typically  be the 
case that the price in state 0, P0.  will  exceed  c for  the 
Group B consumers. 
B)  Differing Stochastic Demands 
Suppose now that customers differ in the demands that 
they have in state  1.  For example, each customer  i could 
have a random term that equals Pj+  were c  is a common 
random component,  is an independent and identically  dis- 
tributed random variable, and p.  is a correlation coeffi— 
1 
cient  (0<Ip.<1)  for consumer i. 
Suppose first that p=O for all customers.  By putting 
together a diversified portfolio of all customers, the law 
of large numbers guarantees that the likelihood  of rationing 
in state 1 will go to zero.  In this setting,  P0 approaches 
c and 
P1 approaches c+F*,  where F*  is the fixed cost  of 
capacity per customer which equals the average amount de- 
manded in state 1.  Each firm has a completely  diversified 
set of consumers.  There is no benefit to a firm from being 
skilled at rationing, just  from being diversified. 
Now suppose p1O. 
To fix ideas,  suppose  that there are 
two groups, Groups A and B with p  equal  to  and 
p8 respec- 
tively where PA>PB>O.  Suppose c  takes on just two values 
with equal probability, -a and a  Then,  the demand curve of 
Group A lies  above that of Group B when E>o and below that 
of Group B when t<o.  Just as before, there may be gains for —  39  — 
trade between the two groups.  The firm will act to shift 
more goods to Group A in the high state of state 1 and to 
Group B in the  low state of state 1.  The firm  accomplishes 
this  reallocation  by using its knowledge of customers and 
its rationing  ability.  Each customer pays  a price in state 
0 and  faces  a rationing rule and price in state 1.  The 
prices and rationing  rule vary by p.  Notice that  as long 
ss  for the group of customers, then there will be 
aggregate uncertainty  in the demand curve facing the firm in 
state 1 and the need for rationing will persist even when 
each firm is diversified across customer groups. 
We have already discussed how  R will be affected by the 
number and heterogeneity  of customers.  As long  as the need 
for rationing  persists, diversification is costly because it 
affects R through  the number of customers.  This leads to a 
finite firm size even in the presence of constant returns in 
the building  of capacity.  As a customer!s p increases, the 
firm's ability to ration declines (because  the customer adds 
variance to demand,  making more rationing necessary in the 
high state of state 1).  We therefore should expect that 
customers are charged for  p so that their average  price paid 
rises with p.  In summary,  a customer's stochastic  buying 
characteristics influences  the price he pays. 
To illustrate  these ideas,  suppose  Group A has  and 
6A0  Such a group can use the price system efficiently 
because there  are no unobservable states in state 1. -  40  - 
Suppose  Group  B has B>°  That group has  to be rationed 
sometimes  for reasons already discussed.  Half the time 
Group B values  the good more than Group A and vice versa in 
state 1.  Group A would willingly join a firm that uses 
rationing even  though Group A's demand curve is unchanged 
between the high and low state in state 1.  The reason is 
that Group B can "trade" with Group A if they are  in the 
same firm.  The firm would charge Group A a price below c+F* 
which allows  them to expand their consumption  in the low 
state of state 1 but ration them in the high state of state 
1.  This arrangement enables Group B to expand consumption 
in the high state  of state 1.  Again,  the firm is facilitat- 
ing trade between two groups in a situation  where the trade 
could not  otherwise  occur because of the non-existence of a 
separate price in each of the two states in state 1. 
This model emphasizes that in state 1, it is the firm's 
rationing ability  combined with the magnitude of the common 
shock that determines the unavoidable inefficiency  that 
results  from  having a costly price system.  Conditional on 
receiving a large positive shock, , the  system does poorly 
in that this realization of  c  is one that creates lots  of 
deadweight loss  ex post (though  not ex ante in expected 
value).  In response to large increases in demand, prices 
don't rise  and rationing does a poor job at allocating 
goods.  If such  shocks were common there would be more use 
of prices.  Therefore, the consequence of having a  costly - 41  - 
price system is that the allocation  mechanism is not very 
good at coping with large unexpected positive shocks.L1 
VII.  Empirical Evidence 
In this  section,  I report on some available  empirical 
evidence that supports many of the key assumptions and im- 
plications of the theory.  The main assumption and implica- 
tions of the theory are as follows: 
1.  It is costly to use the price system  for some 
goods so that rationing is optimal  when demand is 
high.  Customers will be charged  different  prices 
depending  on the stochastic  nature of their de- 
mand.  For example, customers who buy only  at peak 
times may not be able to obtain the good with the 
same  reliability  or at the same price as steady 
customers. 
2.  The amplitude of price fluctuations  tends to be 
smaller  than that which would occur in the usual 
market clearing model, with price being higher in 
low demand states and lower  in high demand states. 
3.  The system Of market operation involving  rationing 
is not sustainable during extended periods of 
21.  Negative shocks do not raise the same problems because 
rationing  replaces the price system in state 1 only for 
positive shocks. - 42  - 
chronic  excess capacity.  In such a case,  price 
will fall  to marginal cost  because customers see 
no benefit to paying higher prices to guarantee 
supply in the future. 
It is difficult to obtain systematic  evidence on the 
importance  of non-price rationing from published data sourc- 
es because it would be impossible to examine  data  on price 
and quantity and infer rationing.  Instead we must rely on 
evidence more akin to industry studies of particular indus- 
try and accounts in the business press. 
There have been several press accounts documenting the 
imposition  of allocations,  quotas, and non—price rationing. 
By non-price rationing,  I mean instances  where customers are 
put on allocation  and are not able to obtain the full amount 
of their demand.  For example, the Wall Street Journal re- 
ported (7-7-87) that plastics producers (polypropylene)  were 
accepting  no new customers  and had placed quotas on their 
deliveries to existing customers.  Other industries where 
non-price rationing  has been reported include plastics, 
computer chips,  chemicals and various metals.22 
22.  For some  newspaper accounts indicating the existence  of 
non-price  rationing, see  Iron Age,  1/6/75, p. 90 
(non-ferrous  metals), Wall Street Journal, 4/17/84, p. 
1  (aluminum,  electronic  parts, metal fasteners, and 
gypsum  board),  Wall  Street Journal, 4/17/86, p.  1 
(titanium  dioxide), N.Y.  Times,  1/30/84,  p. D-l 
(microprocessor  chips),  Wall Street Journal, 6/3/83, p. 
23 (personal  computers),  N.Y.  Times,  6/29/83 
(semi-conductors),  Wall Street Journal, 10/23/86, p.  1 
(compact  disks), Wall Street Journal,  7/7/87 
(Footnote  Continued) —  43  - 
There  have been several studies documenting  a two- 
tiered pricing system in many metal markets.23  For numerous 
metals,  (e.g.  aluminum,  cobalt, copper, nickel, molybdenum) 
it was typical that there were two prices  one  for spot 
buyers and one for steady  buyers.  The price that the steady 
buyer paid (often called the producer price)  was typically 
different than the spot price.  Consistent with  the  theory, 
the spot price was much more volatile than the price to 
steady buyers who comprised  the bulk of the market. 
One of the rare reports analyzing  these types  of issues 
found:  "  producer prices have not as a rule  risen suf- 
ficiently  to clear the market during periods of scarcity, 
and producers have generally limited their price cuts in 
times of excess capacity.  Because producers reward customer 
loyalty,  those who purchase from a producer at its posted 
prices usually have access to product supplIes in times of 
shortage,  whereas those who rely  on spot purchases risk 
continued  dependence on the spot  market at those timesj'24 
The report also found,  consistent with the theory, that the 
two-tiered system of pricing tends to disappear  when excess 
(Footnote  Continued) 
(plastics),  Chemical and Engineering  News,  4/27/87, p. 
17  (petrochemicals). 
23.  See e.g.,  NcNicol, (1974),  Peck (1967),  Burrows (1972), 
Charles River Associates (1967,  1970)  and  U.S.  Senate 
Hearings (1956). 
24.  P.4,  Charles River Associates (1986). -  44  - 
capacity is expected to persists.  For example,  in nickel, 
copper, and aluminum,  there has been excess capacity for 
several years.  In those  industries, the two—tiered pricing 
System has  vanished. 
The theory predicts that one determinant of a custom- 
er's price is the correlation of that customer's demand with 
that of the firm.  Schwieterman (1990)25  has tested this 
theory for airline  pricing.26  His findings are striking. 
There is a strong relationship between fares and stochastic 
demand patterns.  For example, someone travelling on a re- 
stricted fare (Max Saver Fare> has a correlation with the 
firm's demand of about one third that of other passengers 
travelling on the sane flight.  The  lower correlation  is 
consistent with the passenger on a Max Saver Fare  receiving 
a substantial  discount.27 
25.  Schwieterman,  J.  ,  The  Consequences  of Airline Price 
Deregulation:  A Hedonic Price Approach, Ph.D.  Thesis, 
University of Chicago Public Policy, 1990. 
26.  This airline  case is a bit different from the model 
since  there is no long run relationship  necessarily 
between fliers and airlines (though frequent flier 
programs attempt to create such a relation).  However, 
as long as tickets are purchased ex ante,  the theory of 
the model implies that a buyer's stochastic  buying 
characteristics  should influence the price. 
27.  I recently  had the opportunity to use confidential  data 
to test  the theory for  a manufacturing industry by 
running econometric regressions of the form: 
Price  f  (product characteristics, volume of 
buyer order, volume of one year of 
buyer's orders,  buyer's correlation 
with firm's demand (p)) 
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VIII.  Implications  for Firm Behavior 
The models of costly use of the price system and costly 
use of non-price allocations  can be viewed as defining the 
implicit technologies for allocation  by price and non-price 
methods.  Resources  are used (i.e. costs imposed)  when a 
price system is used and when rationing is used,  Because we 
know the technology  used to allocate,  we are able  to under- 
stand the incentives  to improve these technologies.  I be- 
lieve these incentives lead  to an improved  understanding of 
several aspects of the modern corporation,  especially the 
marketing function. 
P)  Optimal Customer Mix 
We have already seen in the previous sections  how  cus- 
tomers who place different  demands on a firms rationing 
ability are treated differently and have examined  the ir,cen- 
tive of a firm to put together a portfolio of different 
customers.  The theory here is akin to the theory of clubs 
(Footnote  Continued) 
The econometric results relied on several thousand 
monthly observations  across several  hundred customers 
for a several year period.  The coefficient  on  p was 
statistically  significant  and  positive.  The magnitude 
of the coefficient indicated  that different stochastic 
buying patterns of customers  caused price paid to vary 
by as much as 10 to 15 percent. -  46  - 
in which the size and composition of the club affect each 
member's welfare.  To understand the advantage of  a desir- 
able customer mix,  suppose there are several customers whose 
demands are random but are uncorrelated so that the sum of 
their demand curves is non-stochastic.  This enables the 
firm to avoid the problem of being unable to know which 
demand state prevails since by construction the total demand 
curve is always same. 
In general,  when a firm is considering adding a new 
customer,  the firm calculates  the additional cost that  the 
new  customer would impose  on the firm's ability to ration to 
others.  That cost tends to be greater the more positively 
correlated  are the demands of the new customer with existing 
customers.  The gain to the firm is the additional revenue 
(and hence reduced revenue burden on existing customers) 
that  the new customer provides.  It is the covariance of the 
new customer's demand with aggregate firm demand that is the 
key variable that determines how price is set to an individ- 
ual customer.28  This theory of customer mix is analogous to 
optimal portfolio theory.  It implies that "goods" are much 
more heterogeneous than they may initially appear.  P pound 
of product  purchased steadily is  a different product than a 
pound purchased irregularly.  It also implies that one goal 
28.  It is more complicated if the elasticity of demand 
differs among customers.  Moreover, the variance of 
demand could matter if buyers are large. -  47  - 
of the marketing department of a firm is to put together a 
desirable customer mix.29 
B)  Improving  the Fir&s Ability to Allocate 
The knowledge that a seller  has  of its buyers plays a 
crucial role in determining  P..  The  longer a seller  knows 
its  buyers,  presumably the better the ability  of the firm to 
use non-price rationing.  By assigning each salesmen fewer 
customers or by sponsoring  occasions  wherein buyers explain 
their needs to sellers,  the firm can improve its ability to 
use non-price rationing. 
The  firm can improve  its ability to use the price sys- 
tem by improving  its ability to distinguish among different 
aggregate  demand states.  By improving its overall sales and 
marketing force,  the firm can become increasingly  refined in 
its ability to discern different  demand states and can 
thereby charge different  prices for  the different demand 
states.  By investing  to refine its ability to distinguish 
between various states  of demand,  the firm  reaps  the bene- 
fits of being able to use price to allocate goods at low 
29.  Buyers could band together into desirable groupings or 
be banded together by a third party (e.g. brokers, 
middlemen> to achieve  the same desirable result of 
stabilizing  demand.  For example,  advertising agencies 
often package together  different demanders for  TV 
advertising  to produce a stable demand and then 
purchase for  these demanders blocks of advertising time 
from TV networks. - 48  - 
cost.  That is, the firm invests in order to lower  its cost 
of using the price system. 
The incentive  to invest  in order to use the price sys- 
tem more efficiently  and to use non-price rationing  more 
efficiently explains the importance of the marketing  and 
sales function in modern corporations.  It is impossible  to 
tell  whether a firm's investments in marketing are more 
productive in improving  its rationing ability or in lowering 
its costs of using the price system.  A firm may rely more 
or less  on price as its marketing knowledge improves.  One 
prediction is that a firm with many transient  customers  may 
do better improving  its ability to use price because it may 
be easier to learn about aggregate  demand than about custom- 
ers'  relative demands.  In contrast, a firm with a few 
steady customers  may find it easier to learn about relative 
demands and improve its non-price rationing ability.  The 
30  firms in my previous study (Canton (1986))  that I cited 
as evidence in support  of non-price rationing  were firms who 
sold  intermediate  manufactured  products to large steady 
customers. 
C)  Economies of Scope in Marketing 
A seller's knowledge of a customer is an important 
influence in determining  R.  If the firm knows the relative 
demands of a customer for  one product, it may well have 
30.  See note 7, supra at 9. -  49 
insight  into his relative demands for related products.  For 
example,  a lawn store has a high demand for both grass seed 
and fertilizer  during peak demand times.  Because of this, 
there is a natural economy of scope  in marketing, and it 
therefore  makes sense for a single firm  to be in charge of 
the non-price  allocation for several  products when the prod- 
ucts are complementary.  This economy  of scope is likely to 
be most important  when inputs  are used primarily for one 
industry so that the demands for the various inputs are 
highly correlated.  The knowledge spillover  also  creates an 
economy of scope when the price system is used.  As long as 
demands for different products are  correlated,  the firm 
selling  both products can do a better job  of using the price 
system than a firm selling one product  because the firm 
selling both products is able  to improve its overall knowl- 
edge about the state of aggregate  demand about  one product 
by observing  the demand of the other.  For example, market- 
ing personnel  may be able  to pool  information  across prod- 
ucts to better discern the current  demand state of one prod- 
uct. 
D)  Hostility  to Futures ?4arkets 
The knowledge that a firm possesses  to use both price 
and non-price  methods to allocate  goods is a valuable asset 
and one on which the firm earns a return,  if an alternative 
allocation mechanism  were to appear,  the firms valuable -  50  - 
asset  would decline in value.  Firms and organized  markets 
are competitors  in producing "allocations8  and like any 
competitor,  the firm does not like competition.  This phe- 
nomenon explains the hostility firms often have toward the 
introduction  of a new organized futures market in their 
industry.31 
E)  Capital Investment 
The marketing  knowledge that  the firm possesses to 
distinguish different states  of demand and  to determine the 
relative demands of customers  will affect the firm's deci- 
sion of how much capital to invest in.  I expect that firms 
with higher values for R will have a higher ratio of capital 
to customers,  will  earn higher profits, and will have more 
customers  than firms with lower values of R.  This suggests 
that new firms  that will tend to have low values of R will 
have an optimal  scale below that of an established firm with 
a high value of R.  Moreover, in contrast to established 
firms,  entrants will have to rely more on price fluctuations 
to allocate goods despite the large deadweight loss  that 
such fluctuations  may entail.  Entrants may also rely on 
more flexible production technologies even if they are more 
31.  For an example of hostility to a new futures  market, 
use the discussion of the reaction of aluminum firms to 
the establishment  of the aluminum futures market in 
American Metal Market, January 6, 1978,  p.9. -  51  — 
costly  than those used by established firms who have a 
steadier customer  demand. 
F)  Swaps 
In several industries,  firms  often swap product on an 
equal  tonnage basis.  For example,  a paper firm with a cus- 
tomer in New York but a plant in California  may  swap 10 tons 
of paper with a firm with a plant in New York but a customer 
in California.  These swaps often do not involve  prices but 
do require equal tonnages.  In fact,  personnel in charge of 
arranging swaps  may have little or no price making authori- 
ty.  There has been many reasons given for these swaps. 
32 
(See Wiiliamson (1983) and Joyce (1983)) 
.  One  reason for 
swaps that emerges from the theory of this paper is that 
swaps avoid requiring  either firm to incur the  costs  of 
ascertaining  the market price.  This reason for swaps makes 
sense only if prices are highly correlated in the areas 
involving swaps  and if it is not easy to determine the mar- 
ket price in each area.  This theory predicts that swapping 
and non-price allocations  are related phenomena. 
In summary,  recognition of the cost of using both the 
price system and non-price allocations  helps explain the 
32.  Williamson,  0.,  "Credible  Commitments:  Using Hostages 
to Support Exchange," American Economic Review, 73, 
(September  1983)  519-540,  and Joyce,  J., "Why Firms 
Rely on Barter," Disc.  Paper 83-3,  Department of 
Justice (1983). —  52  — 
purpose  of marketing in the modern corporation.  Marketing 
consists of investments designed to improve a firm's knowl- 
edge about  the  level  of aggregate demand and the relative 
demands of customers.  This improved knowledge lowers the 
costs of using price and non-price methods of allocation. 
Economics  of scope in knowledge acquisition explain  the 
incentive  for  the firm to sell related products.  The mar- 
keting ability of the firm  will influence its investment 
decisions  and Its need to rely on price fluctuations. 
IX.  Conclusion 
Relaxation of the assumption of costless use of a price 
system leads to a theory with several implications for opti- 
mal  allocation,  market structure and industrial behavior. 
The theory implies  that rationing is to be expected and that 
a customer's stochastic  pattern of demand will influence  his 
price.  Marketing  departments add value by putting together 
a desirable portfolio of customers and by learning about 
their customers'  needs and using that knowledge to allocate 
goods.  The theory implies  that one reason for  a firm's 
existence  is to facilitate trade amongst its customers. 
This theory explains some  puzzling empirical evidence and 
leads to an improved understanding of industrial structure 
and the marketing  functions of a firm, BIBLIOGRAPHY 
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Appendix 
Theorem  I:  The optimal  taxes are given in eqs.  (I)  and  (3). 
Proof:  Minimizing the objective function following 
Figure 2 subject to the financing constraint 
yields: 
Q to 
= k [t  Q' + QI,  or 
(l—X)  to Q,  Q0 
or 
t  A  or 
(A-i)  =  A, where A  is a negative LaGrange 
1—A 
multiplier and  a  " denotes  differentiation 
with respect to price.  Also, 
Q t1 
A  [t1Q 
+ Q  +  K],  or 
(i-A)t1  Q 
=  A  [Q 
+  KI,  or 
A  + K,  or 
p1  QT  i-A 
(A-2)  t si 
=  All 
+  Ki 
.  QED. 
iAL  2J  It  follows from (A-i)  and (A-2) that  = (14)T0  where 
f  K, andthat T  >  —  1  0 
L 
Qi If there  are several states of demand,  i,  and if 
increases  with i, then t  could increase or 
decrease with i. 
The first order condition requires that 
-t.  =  -X [t.  +  +}j 
The LHS is the marginal deadweight loss (MDWL) 
from increasing  taxes, while the  right  hand side 
is the marginal revenue (NP) from increasing 
taxes  times (-A).  It is reasonable to assume 
upward sloping in t and MR is downward 
in t, as illustrated in Figure  P-l. 
iure  A-i 
As  increases,  the MDr!L  (t) curve could  shift up or 
down, as could the MR (t)  curve.  Therefore, without further 
assumptions,  it is possible for t  to either increase or 
decrease with 1. 
It is possible to identify conditions under which taxes 
will move procyclically.  For example, if demands are lin- 
ear,  then  it immediately  follows that 
t1 increases  with i 
((-A) MR(t) curve shifts  up; MDL (t) curve remains un- 
changed). 
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Theorem  3:  The equilibrium size of a firm tends to be 
larger with rationing  as compared to the case of 
costless use of a price system. 
Proof:  The equilibrium N occurs where average  consumer 
surplus is maximized.  There are  two effects 
that  determine the optimal N.  First as N 
increases, the capacity available  to satisfy the 
needs of a single customer during peak demand 
falls.  This represents a cost.  Moreover, 
because demand curves slope downward, the 
marginal loss  from increasing customer size 
increases  as illustrated in Figure A2.  The 
marginal gain from increasing  the number of 
customers  comes from the reduction  in the tax 
burden that results as the fixed costs  are 
spread over more customers.  The marginal gain 
from reducing taxes is likely  to be greatest 
when there are already large taxes  in place. 
Fiqure A-2 
7* 
—  CA'... 
- -  58  - 
Therefore,  the marginal gain from  lowering 
taxes will tend to decrease with existing 
size.  The intersection  determines the optimal 
N. 
When there is no cost to using a price system, 
then the firm can  'tax in all configurations 
L  H  of demand (i.e..  in  and Q1 separately)  and 
that means that any total  tax burden can be 
financed  by causing less  marginal distortions 
in any one state on average,  than when there is 
a constraint that  taxes in two demand states 
must be equal.  Therefore, for any  N,  the 
marginal gain from financing - which  depends  on 
existing distortions - tends  to be lower under 
competition.  This lower marginal gain from 
financing  is illustrated  as the dashed curve in 
Figure  A-2.  The marginal loss  from increasing 
N  will tend to remain roughly the same for any N 
whether or not the price system is costless 
because of the perfect rationing  assumption.  As 
Figure A-2 indicates, this implies that the firm 
is smaller  when use of the price system is 
costless. Theorem 4:  As rationing ability improves,  ceteris paribus, 
3t  >Oandt <0, where 
i1  0  0 
P.  = P.  [1  + api  a>o 
Proof:  One  of the first order conditions  for the 
problem specified in  (6)  is: 
to  Q =  A  [t  QT + Q01  or 
(A-4)  =  A 
,  where  all  terms  were  00 
defined  previously.  As P.  increases,  the 
marginal deadweight loss from increasing  t1 
increases.  This causes the shadow price -X) 
associated with the financing  constraint to 
increase.  From the above first—order  condition, 
to increases  as  (—A)  increases.  As 
increases,  falls to keep revenue  constant. 